Naval War College Review
Volume 59
Number 1 Winter

Article 17

2006

Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies:
Disguising Innovation,
Robert C. Rubel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Rubel, Robert C. (2006) "Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 1
, Article 17.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Rubel: Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation,

that intelligence was analyzed and interpreted. He is clearly disturbed by the
apparent usurpation of national intelligence activities by the Department of
Defense. The reader is left with the nagging suspicion that further such consolidation may not be in the best interests
of the country’s leadership, since opposing opinions already appear to have
no voice.
Hersh concludes Chain of Command by
posing a troubling set of questions. “How
did eight or nine neo-conservatives who
believed that a war in Iraq was the answer to international terrorism get their
way? How did they redirect the government and rearrange long-standing
American priorities and policies with so
much ease?” Discerning readers must
look past the author’s bias and answer
for themselves. While it is arguable
whether this book will earn the stature
of My Lai 4, Hersh succeeds in confronting us with important questions
that force us to look harder at ourselves
and our country.
RON RATCLIFF

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Pierce, Terry C. Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation. New York: Frank
Cass, 2004. 265pp. $115

Captain Terry Pierce is a serving naval
officer who has studied innovation at
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, under the supervision
of Stephen Rosen. This book appears to
be the author’s dissertation, written as
part of a series on strategy and history
edited by Colin Gray and Williamson
Murray.
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Beyond that, nothing about this book is
clear or straightforward, including the
title. The title leads one to think that
the book will examine how revolutionary technologies have transformed warfare, but the subtitle, “Disguising
Innovation,” should serve as a warning—nothing is as it first seems. This
work is a sociological study of how the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have
achieved what the author terms “disruptive innovations” (new ways of
combining technologies that create new
forms of warfighting) and sustaining
innovations (those that improve existing forms). Technology plays a distant
second fiddle to doctrine. Pierce’s major thesis is that the catalysts for disruptive innovation are senior military
officers. How these officers manage the
disruptive innovation process is key. He
shows that they establish small groups
to define the tasks that must be carried
out to conduct a new form of warfare,
ensure that like-minded officers are
promoted, and most intriguingly, disguise the disruptive innovation as
merely improvements to existing
modes, in order to avert ruinous opposition from entrenched interests. In
support of his thesis Pierce offers a
number of case studies, including amphibious warfare, Japanese and American carrier warfare in World War II,
and Marine maneuver warfare. A nice
twist is the inclusion of more recent
case studies like surface-land-attack
warfare and the Tactical Collaboration
Network.
After a promising first chapter in which
the author generally defines his terms
and surveys the existing literature on
disruptive innovation, however, comes
a nearly disastrous attempt to establish
a theoretical framework to support the
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analysis of the following case studies.
Chapter 2 is almost unreadable, apparently due to the failure of anyone actually to read or edit it. Apart from turgid
and sloppy language, the chapter’s most
egregious defect is the author’s nonsensical adaptation of charts from Clay
Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma,
a standard in the innovation literature.
Pierce employs his own versions of
Christensen’s charts but leaves out certain key elements, with the result that
the reader has no hope of making sense
of them. This will give the knowledgeable reader serious doubt regarding the
validity of the book.
However, things get better as Pierce
swings into the case studies. He contrasts successful attempts to institutionalize disruptive innovations, like the
Marine Corps shift to offensive amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s,
with such failed efforts as Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt’s Project 60, an attempt
to refocus the Navy on sea control.
Pierce also compares the management
methods used to promote sustaining innovations, such as continuous-aim
gunfire, with those successful in promoting disruptive innovations, and he
finds significant differences. In the end,
a degree of clarity is attained, and by
the final chapter the reader can with
some effort understand and even agree
with the author’s main arguments. In
fact, people engaged in military innovation efforts will likely find some practical insights.
If, then, this book, despite its flaws, can
be useful for the knowledgeable military officer, academic, or defense industry manager, it is most definitely not for
the uninitiated or casual reader. Ultimately, it is too hard to follow and contains too many editing errors to be
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recommended as a worthwhile investment for the general reader. It is too
bad that neither Pierce’s advisers nor
his publisher extended the effort to review and edit his dissertation properly;
it could have had far wider appeal and
value.
ROBERT C. RUBEL

Naval War College

Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking
without Thinking. New York: Little, Brown, 2005.
277pp. $15.57

Among the many attributes desired in
professional military officers is the ability to make extremely rapid decisions
under conditions of extreme stress and
peril, and for the highest imaginable
stakes. Decisions may even have to be
made in less time than is available consciously to weigh the alternatives and
select a course of action. Although not
unique—others, including doctors, law
enforcement officials, and firefighters,
face similar situations and under equivalent expectations—such demands are
not a common part of most people’s
work experience.
In Blink Gladwell examines rapid, almost instantaneous, decision making—
decisions made in the “blink of an eye.”
The book advances an intriguing and
seductive proposition, that people can
be trained to make nearly instantaneous
decisions using minimal amounts of
data and yet achieve remarkable percentages of successful outcomes. If
reading Blink could produce such a result, the book would represent one of
the most significant advances in the
field of decision making in decades.
Unfortunately, such is not the case.
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